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Topology Adaptation for Robust Ad Hoc Cyberphysical Networks
under Puncture-Style Attacks
Ying Liu and Wade Trappe
Abstract: Many cyber physical networks will involve ad hoc deployments utilizing peer-to-peer communications.
Examples include transportation systems where a group of moving cars communicate in order to avoid collisions,
teams of robotic agents that work together in support of disaster recovery, and sensor networks deployed for
health-care monitoring, monitoring the operation of a factory plant or to coordinate and actuate mechanisms for
energy conservation in a building. These networks may face a variety of threats that puncture their connectivity
and, should their performance degrade, the result could be catastrophic. Consider, for example, a vehicular ad
hoc network where communication assists collision avoidance. In such a case, degradation could lead to vehicle
accidents. Therefore, in order to overcome network performance degradations and the puncture of a network (such
as blackhole or jamming) which is under attack, we propose an algorithm called the Fiedler Value Power Adjustment
Topology Adaption (FVPATA). FVPATA aims to dynamically adapt an ad hoc network’s topology, even if the attacker
varies its location and in the case of an interference-style attack by increasing the interference power. The algorithm
utilizes the formulation from the graph theory which works with the Fiedler value to guide each node in wireless
ad hoc network utilizing power adjustments to enhance the network’s overall robustness. The advantage of the
proposed mechanism is that it is a light-weight approach which is totally distributed, based on topology updates
inherent in the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol and, hence, it is unnecessary to introduce additional
messages. Additionally, an algorithm was developed to resolve problems involving asymmetric links that arise in ad
hoc networks by eliminating unnecessary energy consumption of Fiedler nodes. Simulation results using NS3 show
that the proposed mechanism successfully decreases the average amount of hops used by 50% and the delay of
flows when nodes are migrating at a modest rate below 60 m/min.
Key words: algebraic connectivity; Fiedler value; topology adaptation; distributed power control; ad hoc networks
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Introduction

Many cyberphysical systems will be deployed using
ad hoc wireless technologies, involving autonomous
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entities such as robots maneuvering in an environment.
Such wireless networks can be easily subjected to a
variety of attacks primarily because the transmission
medium is an open one, allowing for observation and
introduction of interference or false messages. These
problems are particularly pernicious in the case of ad
hoc networks where nodes in the network communicate
with each other in a dynamic and opportunistic
manner. In ad hoc cyberphysical networks, a malicious
attacker can simply employ interferences to cause
legitimate nodes around him unable to communicate
with the neighboring nodes. Alternatively, he could

Ying Liu et al.: Topology Adaptation for Robust Ad Hoc Cyberphysical Networks   

also introduce attacks that would puncture the network
by dropping packets or locally disrupting the routing
procedure. In either case, a region of the network
becomes unusable and the performance of the network
significantly degrades around the areas near the attack.
There are many other complementary tools that can
be used to cope with such attacks directed against
ad hoc networks. These countermeasures are grouped
into four main categories: (1) carefully design routing
protocol to re-route packets around the attack area[1–4]
and those attack areas can be discovered by machine
learning methods[5–7] ; (2) implement multi-path plus
tunneling to add redundancy to the current route[8–12] ;
(3) adjust the location of network nodes[13–15] ; and (4)
apply robust and redundant coding[16–20] .
In this paper, we examine a complementary approach
to coping with jamming attacks in a distributed fashion
in an ad hoc network. Our approach aims to aid
the participants in an ad hoc network to avoid holes
punctured in the network connectivity by an attacker
through network control algorithms, and to strengthen
the reliability of communication should the attacker
shut down one or more of the legitimate nodes. In
order to accomplish this, we propose an algorithm
that aims to control the network topology so it can
minimize network degradation in the instances of an
attack. Our proposed Fiedler Value Power Adjustment
Topology Adaption (FVPATA) algorithm is integrated
with the popular OLSR routing protocol for wireless
ad hoc networks and it uses the concept of “Algebraic
Connectivity” of a network’s topology, as characterized
by the Fiedler value[21–23] , to identify connectivitysensitive nodes in the ad hoc network. These nodes
then adjust their transmission power to enhance the
network’s robustness. The advantages of FVPATA
are: (1) It only requires an adjustment to the power
employed by a small set of carefully chosen Fiedler
nodes. Thus, this method conserves energy for the
whole network rather than increasing the power for all
nodes. Additionally, increasing the power of every node
can introduce undesirable interference, which often
results in a decrease of the network throughput. (2) It
is a distributed algorithm involving only local actions to
affect the entire operation of the network. Each node
uses a unique network topology shared by hello and
TC messages of the OLSR protocol, and it tailors the
topology through its own local actions.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
provide the background and mathematical foundation
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for our algorithm. In Section 3, we describe the
mechanism of our Fiedler value power adjustment
algorithm in details and demonstrate how the algorithm
can be integrated with the OLSR protocol through
pseudo codes. Indeed, our approach can universally
be integrated with any state-sharing ad hoc network
routing algorithms[24–27] . In Section 4, we analyze
the performance of our FVPATA through simulations
involving scenarios of different attacks, followed by our
conclusion in Section 5.

2
2.1

Background and Theoretical Foundation
Attack model

As a starting point for our discussion, we shall consider
a very simple attack model where an attacker is
positioned near the center of a network since nodes in
the central area are surrounded by densely populated
neighboring nodes and could potentially become a
bottleneck in traffic flows. As an example, we illustrate
a network with an attack in Fig. 1. In this figure, a
single attacker is located near an area in which many
routes intersect, and the attacker can potentially cause
serious structural damage to the network’s topology
by attacking one or more nodes nearby. Our approach
works well with multiple attackers as our approach is
distributed and the power adjustment is done according
to local views of topology. However, for the sake of our
discussion, we consider the case of only one MAC-layer

Fig. 1 A possible scenario of attacks in an ad hoc network.
The red star represents the attacker placed in an area
where many routes and flows must transit through. The
shaded region indicates a region that is “punctured” by
the attacker to effectively isolate many nodes which causes
serious structural damage to the network’s topology.
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attacker causing harm to several neighboring nodes
simultaneously.
An attacker’s goal is to shut down the maximum
number of nodes with a minimum amount of effort.
Therefore, the attacker’s objective is to place himself
in an area with heavy network traffic. In our example,
the MAC-layer attacker continuously injects formatcompliant packets to legitimate nodes without time
gaps in between the packets. As a result, nodes under
attack become unable to communicate properly (e.g.,
access the channel and complete packet transmission
and reception successfully) and essentially become
shut-out from the network’s operation. Throughout our
discussion, we will refer to an ad hoc network that uses
the OLSR protocol[28] . The reason why OLSR is used
is because it can support our algorithm easily since:
(1) its TC message can deliver link connectivity status
from three hops away and it can assist nodes in gaining
complete knowledge of the network connectivity; (2)
it reduces the need for extra messages when updating
topology information; and (3) it is amenable for
executing a distributed algorithm on each node in any
ad hoc network. We note that our approach can apply
equally well to other routing algorithms which have
similar state-sharing features[29] . We can integrate our
algorithm with them in two ways: (1) Utilize the
periodic hello messages to carry the extra topology
information which is from three or more hops away,
such as the hello messages in Dynamic Source Routing
(DSR)[24] and Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
(AODV)[25] . (2) Adopt the self-contained topology
update mechanism in routing protocols, for example,
Global State Routing (GSR)[26] consults the vectors of
link states exchanged with routing information to obtain
the global knowledge of the network topology, and the
On-Demand Packet Forwarding Scheme (ODPFS)[27]
constructs a virtual backbone among nodes. During
the construction, the global topology information is
propagated.
2.2
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Fig. 2a. Moreover, Fig. 2a also indicates that the spread
or variation of the average degree first rises and then
decreases at a larger radio range. Figure 2b implies
that increasing the radio range can cause the number of
mutually reachable source and destination pairs to grow,
which directly corresponds to the graph’s connectivity.
However, after reaching a certain threshold no obvious
growth occurs. This characteristic illustrates that it is
not necessary to increase radio range indefinitely in
order to strengthen the network connectivity. On the
other hand, increasing transmission power without
restraint can inadvertently generate unnecessary radio
interference in the ad hoc network.
2.3

Fiedler value and graph-theoretic connectivity

Now we briefly introduce the graph theory and
lemmas that will be applied in our algorithm, followed

(a) Average degree

Motivating foundation

The main purpose of FVPATA is to increase the
network’s robustness while minimizing the energy
needed to confront an attack. The network’s
robustness/connectivity is closely related to the
node’s degree in a network graph[30] . The average node
degree in a random network (when being deployed
according to a spatial homogeneous Poisson process)
increases with the node’s radio range, as illustrated in

(b) Connectivity

Fig. 2 The relationship among radio range, node degree,
and connectivity.
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by a description on the working mechanism behind
FVPATA.
Network connectivity can be depicted by its algebraic
connectivity, also called the Fiedler value. It is the
second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix,
L.V; E/, of a network’s topological graph, G.V; E/,
where V is a vertex set and E is the edge set connecting
two vertices in graph. The Fiedler value is always
non-negative, and its amplitude is proportional to the
graph connectivity. It is zero if and only if the graph
is disconnected. The number of zero eigenvalues in the
eigenvalue set of L equals to the number of connected
components in a graph. According to Ref. [21], the
Fiedler value represented by 1 , of a graph, G, can
be obtained by the following eigenvalue optimization
problem.
1 D min yT L.V; E/y,
s.t. yT y D 1 ^ yT 1 D 0

(1)

where y is a vector which does not equal to 1.
The Laplacian matrix of a given graph is defined as
follows: Given a graph G.V; E/ without self cycles and
multiple links between two nodes, the Laplacian matrix
L is calculated by
L.V; E/ D D.V; E/ A.V; E/
(2)
where D.V; E/ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
entry contains the degrees for each node. A.V; E/ is
the adjacency matrix with each entry being a value of
zero or one when nodes are connected to each other. In
addition, its diagonal is zero since G.V; E/ has no self
cycles. According to Eq. (2), the Laplacian matrix has
the following properties[31, 32] :
 Lemma 1: L is a symmetric matrix. Its .i; j /th and .j; i/-th entries are same and its diagonal
entries contain each node’s total degree.
 Lemma 2: All its eigenvalues are real since L is
symmetric.
 Lemma 3: L is a positive semi-definite matrix.
Thus, it has no negative eigenvalues. Its first
smallest eigenvalue is always 0 since the sum
of each row or column is zeros. By sorting the
eigenvalues, we obtain: 0 D 0 6 1 6 2 6
   6 n 1 :
 Lemma 4: The number of zeros in eigenvalue
indicates the number of disconnected components
in the graph. If the graph is strongly connected,
then the second smallest eigenvalue 1 , which is
also the Fiedler value, is always larger than zero.
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 Lemma 5: If the attacker kills the links in between
nodes or when the network’s links are broken
because of natural distances, the Fiedler value
1 .V; E1 / 6 1 .V; E/, where E1  E.
 Lemma 6: Fiedler value’s upper bound is limited
to the minimum degree of nodes and the total
number of nodes exists in networks. The upper
bound approaches to the minimum value of
degrees in nodes when the network is large.
The exact relationship between them is given by
Ref. [31].
jV j
1 .V; E/ 6
min dv
(3)
jV j 1 v
Lemma 5 informs us that the Fiedler value can
become larger when adding edges to a graph. Thus,
a network becomes more robust as the Fiedler value
increases, which implies stronger connectivity.
Our objective is to identify the weakest point
in the network connection and heuristically improve
the network by increasing the degree or number of
neighbors associated with that node. Particularly, we
are interested in what happens when we remove a node
from a network’s graph, and hence we will introduce a
modified notion of the Fiedler value, which corresponds
to the impact associated with removing all of a node’s
links (i.e., connections to other nodes in the network).
Specifically, we define a node’s Fiedler value as:
Definition: For a graph G.V; E/, the node Fiedler
value associated with node j corresponds to the Fiedler
value 1 .V; E1 /, where E1 corresponds to a revised set
of edges for G where all edges containing node j have
been removed from E.
With this definition in mind, we can re-examine the
connectivity of the topologies that remain on a caseby-case basis after removing each node, and discover
the nodes in the network whose deletion would have
the most harmful impact on the network’s algebraic
connectivity. We propose a heuristic for improving the
network’s condition whereby we attach more links to
the nodes with low nodal Fiedler value.
Lemma 6 informs us that increasing the degrees for
all nodes is ineffective because the upper bound of
Fiedler value is constrained by the minimum value of
the degree of the nodes. Conceptually, we only need
to select a few nodes to add links to, and this will be
reflected in the FVPATA algorithm by having each node
examine whether it is in the set of m nodes with the
lowest Fiedler value.
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3

OLSR-Based
Algorithms

Topology

Adaptation

In this section, we use the Fiedler value’s properties
previously described to guide an online cross-layer
power adjustment scheme that enhances the network’s
robustness when facing an attack. The idea is to select a
node that is least-suitably connected to the network. By
increasing the power of transmission on those nodes,
we can strengthen network’s capability by being able
to reach more nodes and thus improve the network’s
overall connectivity.
3.1

Choose the node

As the amplitude of the Fiedler value represents the
network’s connectivity, we choose several nodes in
accordance with their Fiedler values after determining
their associated adjacency matrices with those nodes
removed. Removing a node from the adjacency matrix
means deletion of the corresponding i-th row and
column.
Each node first builds an adjacency matrix for the
topology it obtained in an online manner from OLSR’s
TC and hello messages, which are sent periodically by
OLSR protocol. In the following section, the procedure
for obtaining topology from the OLSR protocol will be
discussed. This topology is updated every T time-units
where T is a free parameter that can be adjusted. Upon
obtaining the adjacency matrix, a node calculates a list
of Fiedler values from the remaining adjacency matrices
through removing each node. A node with the smallest
Fiedler value indicates that deletion of that particular
node will cause maximum damage to the network.
Moreover, nodes with the least number of links often
correspond to being located in a less densely populated
area, or in an area without many surrounding neighbors.
They could also be located in an environment where
the condition of the local channel is poor with large
levels of local noises making them likely to be Fiedler
nodes. In these situations, increasing the nodes’ power
might be inefficient due to a significant amount of
energy being needed to reach other nodes or to
overcome the channel conditions. However, to give
them the opportunity to connect to a larger network, our
algorithm is iterative in the sense that it continuously
chooses the weakest nodes from the resulting network
topology. Each node in the minimum Fiedler value set
will choose to increase its power with probability p.

We choose p according to the binomial distribution,
in terms of n1 , where n1 is the number of nodes with
the least number of neighbors and N is the network


1 k.N n1 /
and k is
size. Hence, p equals to 1
1
N
a parameter that manages the tradeoff between adding
power and redundancy while k can vary for each node.
Upon obtaining the self-evaluated Fiedler node id,
a node ascertains whether this node id is identical to
its own. If so, it starts to increase transmission power
until reaching the degree or power limit. Otherwise,
it recalculates the Fiedler value using the remaining
adjacency matrices. The remaining adjacency matrices
are obtained by deleting the row and the column of each
corresponding Fiedler node id that was obtained from
the previous round. This process iterates until reaching
a maximum number of iterations, or a node becoming a
Fiedler node, whichever happens first.
3.2

Getting the updated topology

The adjacency matrix for the network’s topology is
critical when calculating the Fiedler value. We obtain it
from the TC and hello messages of the OLSR protocol.
3.2.1

Hello messages and obtaining one- and twohop neighbors

Hello messages in OLSR protocol provide both one
and two hops of neighboring link status information.
Messages not received by directly connected neighbors
are discarded. Figure 3 shows the hello message
format and contains the link status information from
the network topology. The link code in the hello
message identifies both the link and the neighbor
type between the originator and its following list of
neighbor interfaces. When receiving hello messages,
the originator’s main address is stored into the
neighbor’s main address in the neighbor tuple as shown
in Fig. 3a. The originator is the node’s one-hop
neighbor if the main address of “Neighbor Interface
Address” field is the address of the node itself. The
rest of the main address of the “Neighbor Interface
Address”, whose neighbor type is symmetric specified
by the link code, corresponds to the node’s twohop neighbors that are intermediately connected by
the originator. This two-hop neighbor’s main address
is stored in the two-hop neighbor’s tuple, shown in
Fig. 3a. Figure 3b illustrates the mapping from the
protocol field to the network topology.
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(a) Hello message

Fig. 3

3.2.2

TC messages for obtaining more than twohop neighbor link status

Integrating Fiedler value into the OLSR
protocol

Therefore, the OLSR protocol gives the opportunity for
a node to construct self-evaluated adjacency matrices
to support the ability for each node to calculate
Fiedler values that represent the network connectivity.
Whenever a hello or TC message is received, the OLSR
protocol processes the messages and stores the link
connections in each corresponding tuples. At each time
interval, a node re-computes the adjacency matrices
according to their neighboring table. If nodes have
symmetric links between them, then the corresponding
entry of the adjacency matrice is set to be one,
otherwise, it is zero. The diagonals of the adjacency

Fig. 4

(b) Two-hop neighbors

Hello message and data structure storing one or two-hop neighbors.

Since a node only receives one-hop neighbors’ hello
messages, we are unable to obtain link statuses on
nodes that are more than two hops away from hello
messages. Therefore, we had to adopt TC messages
to solve this issue. When receiving TC messages, a
node first verifies whether the sender of TC messages
is from the set of trusted one-hop neighbors. If not, it
discards the message. If yes, it updates the TC tuple
shown in Fig. 4 if and only if the Advertised Neighbor’s
Sequence Number (ANSN) is larger than the previous
one stored. Else, it adds a new TC tuple if there is
no record found. The “originator” field in the OLSR
message is then copied to the main address and the
Advertised Neighbor’s Main Address is also copied to
the neighbor’s main address shown in Fig. 4.
3.2.3
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TC message and data structure of storing neighbors.

matrice are set to be as zeros since a node has
no self cycle. However, a node is able to set the
exploration time for itself. One exploration corresponds
to removing a connectivity-weakest node from the
adjacency matrix. This exploration process iterates until
the connectivity-weakest node becomes the node itself
or when the total exploration time is reached. As soon
as a node realizes it is the connectivity-weakest node, it
begins to increase its transmission power if its degree is
below the total degree limit and its transmission power
is lower than the total power limit. The node stops
increasing its transmission power within a certain time.
This process is online and distributed and the pseudo
code is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Increase the transmission power of Fiedler
nodes until each of them reaches the degree limit
Initialization degree limit = D and power limit = P
Every time slot:
Get adjacency matrix from the OLSR protocol by hello and
TC messages
Get n1hfrom adjacency matrix andiset explore to be zero

1 explore.N n1 /
while 1
1 N
< threshold do
for i from 0 to num nodes 1 do
remove node i from adjacency matrix
calculate the second smallest eigenvalue
fiedler list.push back(the second smallest eigenvalue)
end for
= get the connectivity-weakest node =
Sort(fielder list)
= index 0 refers to the smallest fielder value =
node to adjust = fielder list(0);
if node to adjust = self id then
if self degree< D and self power < P then
increase power of node to adjust
break
end if
adjacency matrix.remove(node to adjust)
exploreDexploreC1
end if
end while
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3.3

Symmetric and asymmetric links

In FVPATA, we only consider symmetric links to meet
the requirements of the OLSR routing table so that
we can guarantee packets are successfully delivered.
However, asymmetric links may occur. For example,
one Fiedler node may raise its transmission power in
order to get connect with another node. However, that
node might remain at the same transmission power if
that node’s total degree limit has already been reached
or that node is not a Fiedler node. In this case, the
Fiedler node continues to increase its transmission
power and wastes the energy oblivious to the other
node having no willingness/incentive to cooperate. For
instance, in Fig. 3b, the advertised neighbor already has
four neighbors. If the degree limit is three, it has no
incentive to increase its power to connect with the node.
Thus, an asymmetric link may exist between a Fiedler
node and a non-Fiedler node, as shown in the dotted
line in Fig. 3b. Further, the Fiedler node will iteratively
increase its power until its total power limit is reached.
To solve the problem caused by asymmetric links,
we require each non-Fiedler node to verify whether the
Fiedler node has enough neighbors before increasing
its power. After n time intervals, a non-Fiedler node
verifies whether the Fiedler node is an asymmetric
neighbor. If yes, then it examines whether the Fiedler
node is a two-hop neighbor of itself and whether the
number of Fiedler node’s neighbors remains under its
degree limit. If the answer to both conditions is yes,
this non-Fiedler node will increase its power if the
power limit for itself has not been reached. This process
iterates until the Fiedler node becomes its symmetric
neighbors or when the number of Fiedler node’s
neighbors have reached the degree limit, whichever
comes first. The link code in hello message can indicate
whether the link is asymmetric or symmetric with the
symmetric links being its neighbors. Algorithm 2 gives
the pseudo code when dealing with asymmetric issues.
Our power adjustment algorithm has weaknesses
and does not solve all the problems. Firstly, since
the beacons in the OLSR protocol may update the
topology too fast, it may cause an overshoot of some
nodes’ degrees and may result in larger interference
due to too much transmission power. Secondly, the
algorithm does not totally solve the asymmetric link
problem although we designed the algorithm to allow
non-Fiedler nodes to respond to the connection request
of Fiedler nodes. However, for a node which is in a low
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Algorithm 2: Solve asymmetric links of Fiedler node
After n time slots:
if node is not Fiedler node but the obtained Fiedler node is its
asymmetric neighbor then
if Fiedler node is node’s two hop neighbors then
calculate the number of Fiedler node’s neighbors from
self-evaluated adjacency matrix
if Fiedler node degree < D and self power < P then
increase non-Fiedler node power
end if
end if
end if

density area, even if some nodes reply to its request,
the final degree still cannot meet the degree requirement
and that node continues to increase transmission power
until exhausting all the energy.

4
4.1

Simulation
Simulation results

Simulations were performed using the NS3 network
simulator. The topology used in the simulations is
shown in Fig. 5a. There are a total of 25 nodes
positioned in a grid with an interval of 500 meters
in between nodes both horizontally and vertically.
Exploring the case of a grid topology gives us a clear
view on the operation of our schemes. In the study,
we introduced a total of six flows running through the
networks simultaneously, shown as green lines in the
Fig. 5a. As we can see, those flows are close to each
other and this creates interferences among themselves.
Beyond the existence of interferences among flows,
we introduced an attacker who can simultaneously
shut down several nodes near its location. We also
assumed the attacker’s power would grow gradually
so that he can affect one node to five nodes. We
examined the effectiveness of FVPATA in terms of
average hop, delays, and throughputs under different
attacking scenarios. The results show that FVPATA
has provided a significant improvement in performance
when the nodes are under these different kinds of
attacks.
We placed the attacker at four different locations,
corresponding to four scenarios where they are all
approximately centered around the populated area as
shown in Fig. 5a. The purpose behind this attack was to
simulate the attacker’s attempts to reach out to as many
flows as possible. In the first scenario, we assumed the
attacker had a relatively low power level based on its
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(a) Topology

(b) True path

Fig. 5 Topology, flow pattern, attacker position, and true
paths. (a) Numbers in parentheses refer to different jamming
locations. “1” denotes a MAC-layer attacker at Node 12. “2”
denotes a MAC-layer attacker between Nodes 12 and 17. “3”
depicts a MAC-layer attacker located at the intersection of
diagonal lines of Nodes 12, 13, 17, and 18. “4” refers to a
MAC-layer attacker located at Node 12 with a radio range of
500 meters. (b) Changes of true paths with one node failure
with or without FVPATA.

radius of impact; hence, he could only attack one node
in the network. Therefore, we chose Node 12, which
is the center of the whole topology. For the second
attacking scenario, the MAC-layer attacker raised its
transmission power with an effective attacking range of
250 meters. We placed the attacker in between Node
17 and Node 12 to block the source transmission as
much as possible. For the third scenario,
we increased
p
the attacker’s radio range to be 2  250 meters and
position it at the intersection of two diagonal lines of a
rectangle composed by Nodes 12, 17, 13, and 18. In the
last scenario, we set the attacker’s radio range to 500
meters and put it in the center of the flows again. Under
this condition, the attacker could affect Nodes 12, 11,
17, 13, and 7. Under all four scenarios, the attacker’s
interference range increases so as the attacker’s ability
to affect other nodes.
The simulation runs contained 1000 time-units and
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our application data started at 100 time-units after the
routing tables were established and continuously fed
into the network without gaps in time. The attacker
started the attack at 100 time units while the OLSR
protocol was running continuously to maintain the
routing information. Hello messages for the OLSR
protocol were sent every 2 time units and TC messages
were sent at every 5 time-units when RTS/CTS was
turned off. FVPATA started when it detects a 80:5775%
packet loss ratio and explored at most five times in each
time interval.
Figure 5b shows the changes of the route from
source Node 22 to destination Node 2 after suffering
from an attack with the application of FVPATA. Here
we consider Scenario 1 (where only Node 12 is the
node under attack) as the simplest case for an easier
understanding on the concept. In Fig. 5b, the black
route is the general case under the absence of an attacker
and FVPATA. The route walks through Node 12, travels
through Node 18, and finally reaches Node 2 which
is used as a baseline for comparison. The red line
is a route depicting the aftermath of shutting down
Node 12 by an attacker without application of FVPATA.
As the figure suggests, the red route skips Node
12 and the OLSR protocol finds an alternative route
running through Node 13. Although the OLSR protocol
has self-recovery capabilities, the disabled Node 12
causes traffic congestion around the affected nodes
which resulted in more network-layer interference. This
condition becomes even worse when more than one
node breaks down. Therefore, we cannot solely rely on
the self-recovery mechanism of the OLSR protocol. The
brown route represents the condition when FVPATA is
applied after nodes detected an abnormal packet loss.
The figure shows that Node 2 increased its transmission
power since it is the Fiedler node. Moreover, to obtain
a degree of 6, a non Fiedler node (Node 11) also
increases its transmission power and as a result, Node
2 could directly reach Node 11. Thus, the final route
contained only two hops and it reduced the switching
time spent by Nodes 6 and 16. FVPATA has effectively
diminished the total transmission time by cutting down
the number of hops needed for the flows. Figure 6 also
demonstrates that FVPATA actually lowers the delay of
the whole path.
While examining Fig. 6, it is clear that it illustrates
the decrease in the average number of hops and the
mean delays among six total flows after the application
of FVPATA while the network is under attack. The
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Fig. 6

Average hops and mean delay of all flows.

improvement is apparent and despite more and more
nodes being shut down (Nodes 7, 11, 12, 13, and 17)
in Scenario 4, its average number of hops and mean
delay are the lowest. The possible explanation for this
is that nodes around the attack areas begin to have
reduced connections to the networks. Therefore, with
large probability, removing them can cause network
to be disconnected. For example, in our simulation
topology shown in Fig. 5a, removing Nodes 2 and 5 can
cause a separation of networks into two parts. FVPATA
chooses those nodes near the border and increases
their transmission power and weaves a connection
between them. Therefore, if more and more nodes are
disconnected, nodes near them (may also be two hops
away) are more likely to be selected by FVPATA. Based
on this and FVPATA’s distributed structure, FVPATA
should work well in situations where multiple attackers
exit. In the simulations, we actually saw fewer numbers
of hops when more flow interference exists.
Figure 7 represents the throughput we collected
at each time interval for Scenario 1. We applied
a sliding window with a width of 60 time-

Fig. 7

Throughput for each time slot of Scenario 1.

units to smooth data across time intervals since
the network data collected experienced random
variations. Simulation results indicated FVPATA
increased the network throughputs compared to nonFVPATA employed network. Moreover, FVPATA
converged after approximately 700 time-units and
stabilized thereafter. However, the convergence time
depends on the number of Fiedler nodes participating
in the power adaptation. A much more disconnected
network requires a longer stabilization time.
We also computed the improvement on performance
associated with the application of FVPATA under attack
in Fig. 8. Comparing to the cases without power
adjustments, FVPATA reduces the number average
hops by at least 50% and cuts the mean delay by
at least 60%. To calculate mean throughputs, we
collected data from 700 and 1000 time-units during the
periods where the FVPATA algorithm converges and the
network throughputs stabilize. The calculated mean of
the associated sample data is then compared with the
case without power adjustments. We discovered there
is an improvement by more than 2:5 times in terms of
throughputs.
4.2

Simulation results involving mobility

Besides static networks, we also considered FVPATA’s
performance when facing the mobility of nodes, as
might occur in a cyberphysical application involving
robotic agents. Each node traveled within a square area
of 2000 meters by 2000 meters, randomly changing
direction every two seconds. We set each node as having
the same rate and we increased their rates at succeeding
rounds of simulation. In the simulations, we assumed a
MAC-layer attacker tracked a node as a target and never
changed its target throughout the course of attacks. The

Fig. 8 Performance improvement in terms of average hop,
delay, and throughput.
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MAC-layer attacker could only track one node at a time
since legitimate nodes moved constantly and randomly,
from one place to another. Therefore, it resembles the
effects in Scenario 1 we studied earlier, but in a dynamic
sense. We collected the average numbers of hops, mean
delays, and throughputs data under moving rates of
1 m/s, 10 m/s, 20 m/s, and 30 m/s. Each simulation ran
for 1000 time-units, which is the same as static network.
Figure 9a shows that FVPATA decreases the average
number of hops and mean delays when nodes are
moving at moderate speeds. It also implies that
sometimes increasing speed can help latency. A
possible explanation for this is that some pairs of source
and destination nodes could approach each other, closer
and closer, to shorten the distance and time during the
packet transmission. Figure 9b presents the percentage
improvement on the performance of FVPATA in
average number of hops, mean delays, and throughputs.
We can see that the improvements of mean delay and

(a) Average hops and mean delay
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throughputs are above 50% when the moving speed
is no more than 30 m/s. The percentage improvement
on average hops and throughputs decreases when the
speed of nodes increase, especially the throughputs, it
drops rapidly under a relative high speed. To put the
speed of 30 m/s into perspective, it is equivalent to a car
traveling at speed of 67 mph on the road. Therefore, the
conceptual application of FVPATA in daily life may be
viewed as rather practical.
4.3

Parameters that affect performance

The magnitude of FVPATA’s performance improvement
depends on many factors: (1) The beacons in OLSR
which affect the converging and stabilizing time of
FVPATA. (2) The size of the steps in power increase.
Smaller steps lower the converging time while bigger
steps often overshoot the node degree and waste energy.
(3) The limits on total number of degrees. A larger
number of degrees results in a higher throughput with
more energy consumption. (4) The position of the
attacker and the pattern of network flows. Figure 10
considers the position of attackers simulated by matlab
and the results indicate that the attacker’s position can
also effect network connectivity. Network performance
deteriorates with the number of affected nodes if the
affected nodes are selected by the indication of their
Fiedler values. However, FVPATA works well under
the condition where multiple affected nodes since the
nodes near broken nodes have more opportunity to be
selected as Fiedler nodes and thus, increase their power.
(5) RTS/CTS, this is a solution to the problems of
hidden terminal and the reduction of flow interference.
Since it affects the traffic pattern, it also influences
the network throughputs. (6) The depth of exploring
process in Algorithm 1. A more in-depth exploration of

(b) Performance improvement

Fig. 9 FVPATA’s performance under mobility. (a) FVPATA
decreases the average number of hops and mean delays
under moving nodes; (b) Even with moving node, FVPATA
improves their average number of hops, mean delays, and
throughputs.

Fig. 10 The relationship between attackers’ positions and
graph connectivity in a one-hundred-node network.
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network connectivity indicates a lesser number of hops
in a route, which translates to a much stronger and more
robust network. On the other hand, this also causes an
overshoot in the node power.
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In order to achieve topology adaptation for the resilient
communication operation of cyberphysical networks
deployed using ad hoc networking technologies, we
proposed an algorithm called FVPATA to overcome
attacks that puncture a hole in the ad hoc network. The
objective of FVPATA is to use the Fiedler value, which
approximates the robustness of a graph, to guide the
nodes in the cyberphysical network to discover weak
vertices in the underlying network topology. Each node
verifies and promotes itself to be a frail node if it is the
Fiedler node. Fiedler nodes increase their transmission
power after finding they are weak nodes. FVPATA
is totally distributed since each node can obtain selfevaluated topology information through OLSR routing
messages, which requires no extra communication
messages. After FVPATA converges, the robustness
of the network locally around the Fiedler node is
enhanced. Moreover, we proposed a method to solve the
problems associated with asymmetric links during the
process of increasing power so that nodes will not raise
their power indefinitely. The final state for the network
is that Fiedler nodes are connected to each other,
accompanied by some non-Fiedler nodes participating
as bridges among them. Those Fiedler nodes and special
non-Fiedler nodes compose a backbone for the network.
This structure significantly reduces the number of hops
along a route and lowers the latency, yielding a higher
network efficiency since only a few nodes increased
their power.
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